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CONNECTING THE DOTS:  
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL  
TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE  
IN DOUGHERTY V. CITY OF COVINA 
Carmelo Tringali* 
The relationship between molesting children and possessing child 
pornography is significant, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Illinois v. Gates sets a low threshold requirement for probable cause in 
justifying search warrants. Nonetheless, federal circuit courts disagree 
as to whether evidence of child molestation is sufficient in itself to 
establish probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography. In 
Dougherty v. City of Covina, the Ninth Circuit furthered this circuit 
split by siding with the Second and Sixth Circuits in determining that 
such evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause justifying a 
search warrant. This Comment examines the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
Dougherty and argues that the court incorrectly refused to find 
probable cause justifying the search warrant and set a dangerous 
precedent in doing so. 
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University. I would like to sincerely thank Yxta Murray, Dean Jannell Roberts, Timothy Heafner, 
Joshua Rich, and Christopher Alberico for their inspiration, guidance, and editorial judgment. 
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Tringali. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal appellate courts across the nation are failing to connect 
the dots in determining the validity of search warrants for child 
pornography. This is so, at least, as it relates to the fair probability 
that child molestation suspects also possess child pornography. 
Indeed, in Dougherty v. City of Covina
1
 the Ninth Circuit failed to 
make the logical and commonsense connection between sexually 
abusing a child and possessing child pornography.
2
 There, an 
investigating officer who submitted the affidavit for the search 
warrant was experienced and specially trained in cases involving 
juvenile and sex crimes.
3
 In addition, Bruce Dougherty, whom the 
officer was investigating for inappropriately touching a sixth-grade 
student, had been previously accused of molesting another student 
and engaging in other pedophilic acts.
4
 The court, however, held that 
the officer’s determination that there was a fair probability that 
Dougherty possessed child pornography was “conclusory” and 
“insufficient to create probable cause.”
5
 
By so ruling, the Ninth Circuit joined the Second and Sixth 
Circuits in making it more difficult for law-enforcement officers to 
obtain search warrants and enforce statutes proscribing possession of 
child pornography.
6
 This is particularly troublesome because child 
pornography significantly harms the children involved.
7
 The U.S. 
Senate, for instance, has found that “[c]hild pornography plays a 
critical role in the vicious cycle of child sexual abuse and 
 
 1. 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 2. See United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010) (“There is an intuitive 
relationship between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of child 
pornography.”). See generally Candice Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing 
Child Pornography and Molesting Children, PROSECUTOR, Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 17 (“The act of 
viewing child pornography does not exist in a vacuum. The existence of images that sexually 
exploit children represents tangible evidence of past, present and, most likely, future abuse.”). 
 3. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 899. 
 6. See United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodson, 543 
F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 7. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-358 (1996) (committee report for the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1995); Anton L. Janik, Jr., Combating the Illicit Internet: Decisions by the 
Tenth Circuit to Apply Harsher Sentences and Lessened Search Requirements to Child 
Pornographers Using Computers, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 379, 382–85 (2002) (discussing 
Congress’s intent for passing legislation increasing sentences for child pornographers). 
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exploitation.”
8
 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Dougherty, however, 
impedes society’s ability to protect the children that child 
pornography victimizes. 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly refused 
to find probable cause justifying the search warrant at issue in 
Dougherty v. City of Covina. The facts of the case are established in 
Part II, and the court’s reasoning is analyzed in Part III. Part IV then 
explains that the Dougherty majority (1) misapplied United States v. 
Weber;
9
 (2) unreasonably discounted the significant relationship 
between molesting children and possessing child pornography; and 
(3) should have upheld the search warrant under established Supreme 
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Part V concludes by summarizing 
the Ninth Circuit’s errors in Dougherty and encouraging the Ninth 
Circuit en banc or, preferably, the Supreme Court to overrule 
Dougherty or the precedent established in cases like Dougherty when 
the situation to do so next presents itself.
10
 
II.  STATEMENT  
OF THE CASE 
On October 12, 2006, Officer Robert Bobkiewicz of the Covina 
Police Department and four other police officers searched Bruce 
Dougherty’s home pursuant to a search warrant for child 
pornography.
11
 The officers seized Dougherty’s computer and other 
related items but filed no charges against Dougherty related to the 
search.
12
 Dougherty later sued the City of Covina, Officer 
Bobkiewicz, and the chief of police for violating his Fourth 
Amendment rights.
13
 
Officer Bobkiewicz obtained the search warrant after submitting 
an affidavit reciting certain findings from his investigation of 
Dougherty that stemmed from an inappropriate touching of one of 
Dougherty’s sixth-grade students.
14
 After learning that the student 
 
 8. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12. 
 9. 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 10. Dougherty did not appeal the case because the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
holding on other grounds. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 899–901 (affirming the dismissal without leave 
to amend based on the finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that 
Dougherty failed to state a claim against the City of Covina). 
 11. Id. at 895. 
 12. Id. at 896. 
 13. Id. at 896–97. 
 14. Id. at 896. 
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had won a cross-country meet, Dougherty had placed his hands on 
the student’s breasts and lifted her up in front of the class to a level at 
which he could look at her buttocks.
15
 The molested student stated 
that she had previously seen Dougherty look up other female 
students’ skirts and down their blouses.
16
 The assistant 
superintendant of the school district, Gloria Cortez, also told Officer 
Bobkiewicz about an investigation that she had conducted following 
a student’s report in 2003 that Dougherty pulled down a female 
student’s shirt while the two were alone in Dougherty’s classroom.
17
 
This investigation revealed that Dougherty would often touch girls’ 
backs with his hands in search of bra straps.
18
 Cortez’s investigation, 
however, was discontinued because of inconsistent statements made 
by the student-victim, though the student’s mother later stated that 
she had made a mistake in not believing her daughter.
19
 When 
Officer Bobkiewicz later questioned the student from Cortez’s 
investigation, she confirmed that Dougherty had pulled down her 
shirt, adding that he “touched [my] bare breasts and told [me that I] 
was ‘a special girl.’”
20
 
Officer Bobkiewicz also stated in his affidavit that he had 
fourteen years of experience in the police force, during which he had 
received over a hundred hours of training involving juvenile and sex 
crimes and had conducted hundreds of investigations related to 
sexual assaults and juveniles.
21
 Because of his experience and 
training, Officer Bobkiewicz was the designated “Sex 
Crimes/Juvenile Detective” for the Covina Police Department.
22
 
Officer Bobkiewicz ended his affidavit by concluding that “based 
upon my training and experience . . . I know subjects involved in this 
type of criminal behavior have in their possession child 
pornography.”
23
 
After reviewing Officer Bobkiewicz’s affidavit, the search 
warrant, and Dougherty’s complaint, the district court dismissed 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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Dougherty’s claims against the City of Covina, the chief of police, 
and Officer Bobkiewicz, with prejudice, on August 4, 2009.
24
 
According to the court, the affidavit established probable cause to 
support the warrant.
25
 Dougherty appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
26
 
III.  THE NINTH  
CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
The main issue on appeal, which divided the court,
27
 was 
whether probable cause existed to validate the warrant to search 
Dougherty’s home computer and electronic media for child 
pornography.
28
 The majority began its discussion of probable cause 
by stating that “[s]ufficient information must be presented to the 
magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his 
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others.”
29
 The majority then explained that affidavits containing 
more than bare conclusions were valid if they survived the “totality 
of the circumstances test.”
30
 Under this test, the “magistrate must 
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . including the veracity and 
basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there 
is a fair probability that contraband . . . will be found in a particular 
place.”
31
 
The majority next summarized the facts of United States v. 
Weber and its holding that the search warrant for child pornography 
there lacked probable cause.
32
 In Weber, the investigating officer 
based his affidavit for probable cause on Peter Weber’s receipt of a 
catalog for child pornography two years earlier and on the suspect’s 
more recent purchase of four images of possible child pornography.
33
 
The investigating officer concluded his affidavit by stating that 
“from [my] knowledge of [child molesters, pedophiles, and child 
 
 24. Id. at 897. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 892. 
 27. Judge Brewster concurred in the judgment of the court but disagreed with the majority’s 
probable-cause analysis. See id. at 901–02. 
 28. See id. at 897–99. 
 29. Id. at 897 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)). 
 30. Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39). 
 31. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. Id. at 898 (citing United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 33. Weber, 923 F.2d at 1340. 
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pornography collectors, I] could expect certain things to be at their 
houses.”
34
 In holding that the affidavit contained insufficient 
probable cause to justify a search of Weber’s home, the court 
emphasized that the affidavit was devoid of any evidence that Weber 
was either a child molester or a child-pornography collector.
35
 The 
court there stated that “the government could not search Weber’s 
house for evidence to prove Weber was a collector merely by 
alleging he was a collector.”
36
 
Upon summarizing Weber, the Dougherty majority concluded 
that probable cause could not exist to justify the search warrant of 
Dougherty’s house if probable cause did not exist in Weber.
37
 The 
majority stated that Officer Bobkiewicz’s “affidavit contain[ed] no 
facts tying the acts of Dougherty . . . to his possession of child 
pornography.”
38
 The majority then stressed that no expert had 
concluded that Dougherty was a pedophile and there was no 
evidence that Dougherty had ever received or possessed child 
pornography, was interested in viewing such images, or conversed 
with students about sex acts or pornography.
39
 The majority next 
noted the split in jurisdictions on the question of whether evidence of 
child molestation alone creates probable cause for a search warrant 
for child pornography.
40
 It then implicitly adopted the Second and 
Sixth Circuits’ approach to that question by concluding that Officer 
Bobkiewicz’s conclusory statement that Dougherty, an alleged child 
molester, possessed child pornography was insufficient to create 
probable cause.
41
 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE  
NINTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
The Ninth Circuit erred thrice in Dougherty: it (1) misapplied 
Weber; (2) unreasonably discounted the significant relationship 
between molesting children and possessing child pornography; and 
 
 34. Id. at 1345. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 898. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 898–99. 
 40. Id. at 899. 
 41. Id. 
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(3) should have upheld the search warrant according to established 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. 
A.  The Dougherty Majority Misapplied Weber 
It is doubtful that Weber dictated the outcome in Dougherty, as 
the Dougherty majority claimed. The search warrant in Weber lacked 
probable cause not merely because there was insufficient evidence 
that Weber possessed child pornography, as the Dougherty majority 
asserted, but also—and primarily—because the affidavit there did 
not “lay a foundation . . . show[ing] that the person subject to the 
search [was] a member of the class” of persons who could be 
expected to possess child pornography.
42
 Indeed, the Weber court 
acknowledged that the expert opinion of a police officer could 
establish probable cause in the absence of direct evidence that a 
suspect possessed child pornography but found that such an opinion 
was unfounded in that case.
43
 This was because the affidavit in 
Weber contained insufficient evidence that Weber was a child-
pornography collector and no evidence that he was a child 
molester.
44
 
The court in Weber thus did not address the critical issue 
presented in Dougherty: whether evidence of child molestation 
would have been sufficient in itself to create probable cause for the 
search warrant. The court, however, did suggest that such evidence 
would be sufficient when it stated that the expert opinion of a police 
officer regarding a particular class of people, namely child molesters, 
could establish probable cause if there were evidence that the suspect 
was a child molester.
45
 Accordingly, had there been evidence that 
Weber was a child molester, as there was in Dougherty, the Weber 
court could very well have held that the expert officer’s conclusion 
that Weber possessed child pornography sufficiently established 
probable cause for a search warrant. 
The majority in Dougherty also gave undue weight to one of the 
factors that the Weber court used to distinguish Weber from United 
States v. Rabe,
46
 in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a search warrant 
 
 42. United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
 46. 848 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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for child pornography.
47
 The Weber court noted that in Rabe “there 
was expert testimony in the affidavit which addressed the facts of the 
defendant’s case and specifically concluded that based on those facts, 
the defendant was a pedophile.”
48
 Moreover, the facts in Rabe were 
sufficient to make a judgment as to whether the defendant was a 
pedophile.
49
 In Weber, by contrast, the affidavit consisted mainly of 
“rambling boilerplate recitations,” which demonstrated that “the 
‘expert’ portion of the affidavit was not drafted with the facts of [the] 
case or [Weber] in mind.”
50
 Additionally, the only evidence of 
Weber’s pedophilia, other than the order solicited by the government 
prior to the search, was a child-pornography catalog that had been 
addressed to him that customs had seized twenty months earlier.
51
 
The Weber court, however, only emphasized that the affidavit in 
Rabe contained expert testimony that Rabe was a pedophile for a 
specific and limited purpose: to distinguish Weber from Rabe.
52
 The 
court was prompted to do so in order to dismiss the prosecution’s 
attempt to analogize Weber to Rabe.
53
 Furthermore, because the 
court had already concluded that the evidence was insufficient to 
indicate that Weber was either a child molester or a child-
pornography collector,
54
 pedophilia was the only basis left on which 
the investigating officer could conclude that Weber probably 
possessed child pornography. As such, the court could hardly have 
meant that expert opinion that a suspect is a pedophile is a necessary 
factor for determining whether probable cause exists, especially 
when evidence indicates that the suspect is a child-pornography 
collector or child molester, as in Dougherty.
55
 Accordingly, the 
majority in Dougherty erred in relying as heavily as it did on the 
 
 47. Id. at 998. 
 48. Weber, 923 F.2d at 1345 (citing Rabe, 848 F.2d at 996). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1344. 
 52. See id. at 1345–46. 
 53. Id. at 1345. 
 54. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 35, 44. 
 55. Cf. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“Weber 
cannot be read to support Gourde’s position—that a search warrant for child pornography may 
issue only if the government provides concrete evidence, without relying on any inferences, that a 
suspect actually receives or possesses images of child pornography—without running afoul of 
Gates.”). 
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absence of expert testimony that Dougherty was a pedophile,
56
 
particularly because the facts indicated that he was a child 
molester,
57
 which would likely have been sufficient in itself to create 
probable cause for the search warrant.
58
 
B.  Molesting Children Is Substantially Related 
 to Possessing Child Pornography 
The second problem with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Dougherty stems from its reliance on the questionable theory that 
molesting children is not related to possessing child pornography—
even in the age of the Internet.
59
 The Dougherty majority based this 
conclusion on United States v. Falso
60
 and United States v. 
Hodson,
61
 which opined as much.
62
 These two cases, however, failed 
to cite any studies or other authorities confirming that child 
molestation is not associated with possessing child pornography.
63
 In 
fact, just two years before its decision in Falso, the Second Circuit 
held that “a direct connection exists between child pornography and 
pedophilia,”
64
 a finding that it did not overrule in Falso.
65
 Hence, the 
Dougherty majority’s determination that child molestation does not 
relate to child pornography was not well founded. 
Unlike the assertion that molesting children is unrelated to 
possessing child pornography, the theory that there is indeed a strong 
relationship between these two acts is substantially supported. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that “the evidence . . . collected [to support 
probable cause] must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of 
law enforcement.”
66
 Adhering to the Supreme Court’s mandate, the 
Eighth Circuit has reasoned that “common experience” supports a 
 
 56. The court provided five main reasons for why the search warrant in Dougherty lacked 
probable cause, which included absence of expert testimony that Dougherty was a pedophile. 
Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 57. See supra Part II. 
 58. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
 59. See infra text accompanying notes 69–73. 
 60. 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 61. 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 62. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 63. See Falso, 544 F.3d at 123–24; Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292–93. 
 64. United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 65. See Falso, 544 F.3d at 123 & n.18. 
 66. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 418 (1981)). 
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conclusion that child molesters likely possess child pornography.
67
 
The Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that “common sense would 
indicate that a person who is sexually interested in children is likely 
to also be inclined . . . to order and receive child pornography.”
68
 
Such common-sense and experienced conclusions that child 
molesters possess child pornography are further bolstered by the 
“relative ease with which child pornography may be obtained on the 
internet.”
69
 The Internet provides most people with “access to almost 
any form of electronic information,”
70
 and it has been the “primary 
medium for pornography transmission” since 1998.
71
 The extent to 
which the Internet facilitates obtaining child pornography today is 
further underscored by the Ninth Circuit’s en banc reasoning in 
United States v. Gourde.
72
 The Gourde court distinguished that case 
from Weber largely because the circumstances in Weber were 
“hardly comparable” to those in Gourde since Weber did not involve 
the Internet.
73
 Therefore, because child pornography can now be 
obtained with relative ease, a law-enforcement officer specially 
trained and experienced in the field of child sex abuse, like Officer 
Bobkiewicz in Dougherty, should be able to conclude that an alleged 
child molester possesses child pornography based solely on the 
officer’s experience and on facts indicating that the suspect is a child 
molester. 
Even if more evidence than an expert law-enforcement officer’s 
determination were required to establish probable cause that a child 
molester also possesses child pornography, significant research and 
findings additionally support the existence of such a relationship. In 
its hearings leading up to its enactment of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996, Congress found that “child pornography is 
often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and 
whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out 
 
 67. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 68. United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 69. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578. 
 70. Laura Davis et al., Controlling Computer Access to Pornography: Special Conditions for 
Sex Offenders, FED. PROBATION, June 1995, at 44. 
 71. Janik, supra note 7, at 379 & n.4 (quoting Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the 
Internet: The New Battle Against Child Pornography, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 541, 541 
(1998)). 
 72. 440 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 73. Id. at 1073–74 (citing United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
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with children.”
74
 The Senate has similarly noted that “[l]aw 
enforcement investigations have verified that pedophiles almost 
always collect child pornography or child erotica.”
75
 This 
pornography “[i]s an addiction that escalates,” culminating in the 
“acting out” of that which the viewer has seen.
76
 Accordingly, since 
sexually abusing children is the ultimate stage of this progression, it 
is not surprising that “[l]aw-enforcement officers . . . routinely find 
pornographic materials when they investigate sex crimes against 
children.”
77
 
Such congressional findings deserve a high level of judicial 
dereference because Congress is the superior governmental 
institution for fact finding.
78
 In United States v. Perillo,
79
 the court 
found that a statute authorizing wire interception of a suspect’s 
phone lines did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
80
 In justifying the 
governmental intrusion, the court emphasized, in part, “that Congress 
specifically found as a fact that such tools as wiretapping and 
‘bugging’ were essential to combat organized crime.”
81
 The court 
then demonstrated the high level of deference owed to such findings 
by noting that “the Supreme Court went so far as to assume facts 
which Congress might have found and then deferred to them” in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan.
82
 Thus, the Dougherty majority should have 
been more deferential to congressional findings that sexually abusing 
children is related to possessing child pornography. 
Independent research, moreover, confirms that child molestation 
and pedophilia are substantially related to possessing child 
pornography. A 2000 Federal Bureau of Prisons study revealed that 
76 percent of offenders convicted of Internet-related crimes against 
children admitted to previously molesting children, which law 
 
 74. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-26 to -32 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), invalidated in 
part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 75. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12–13 (1996). 
 76. Id. at 13. 
 77. Id. (quoting SHIRLEY O’BRIEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (1992)). 
 78. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the 
magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy.”). 
 79. 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971). 
 80. Id. at 915, 923. 
 81. Id. at 918–19. 
 82. Id. at 918 n.27 (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). 
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enforcement had failed to discover.
83
 Furthermore, these convicts 
had an average of 30.5 child sex victims each.
84
 U.S. Postal 
Inspection Service reports similarly indicate that more than 
80 percent of child pornography purchasers are active abusers, and 
child pornography was connected with every incident of reported 
child molestation in Louisville, Kentucky, from 1980 through 
1984.
85
 U.S. Senate Reports
86
 and independent articles
87
 also cite the 
progression from watching child pornography to sexually abusing 
children. For instance, a “developmental pattern” has been identified 
among pedophiles who interact with children, which “begins with 
fantasy, moves to gratification through pornography, then voyeurism, 
and finally to contact.”
88
 
Other behavioral analyses of child molesters have likewise 
concluded that “there is little behavioral doubt that probable cause to 
believe a given individual is a preferential sex offender is, by itself, 
probable cause to believe the individual collects pornography . . . 
related to his preferences.”
89
 This is because preferential child 
molesters generally collect child pornography.
90
 Additionally, 
“preferential-type offenders,” such as pedophiles, are much easier to 
investigate because they exhibit these “highly predictable and 
repetitive behavior patterns.”
91
 
The results of congressional hearings and independent research 
thus overwhelmingly evince a significant relationship between 
pedophilia, molesting children, and possessing child pornography. 
These findings provide additional support for the common-sense and 
experienced conclusions of expert law-enforcement officers that such 
a relationship exists where evidence suggests that a suspect is a 
pedophile or child molester. The Ninth Circuit should have therefore 
accepted that molesting children and possessing child pornography 
 
 83. Kim, supra note 2, at 20. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 17. 
 86. See S. REP. NO. 104-358 (1996). 
 87. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 2, at 19–20. 
 88. Id. at 20. 
 89. See, e.g., KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 106 
(5th ed. 2010). A “preferential sex offender” is characterized by (1) “long-term and persistent 
patterns of behavior”; (2) “specific sexual interests”; (3) “well-developed techniques”; and (4) 
“fantasy-driven behavior.” Id. at 52. 
 90. Id. at 79. 
 91. Id. at 51. 
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are strongly related not only because Officer Bobkiewicz stated as 
much in his affidavit based on his training and experience but also 
because Congress and independent research has found such a relation 
to exist. 
C.  The Dougherty Court Should Have Upheld the  
Search Warrant According to Established  
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Precedent 
As the Supreme Court stated in Illinois v. Gates
92
 and the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged in Dougherty v. City of Covina,
93
 under the 
“totality of the circumstances test,” a magistrate must “make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , including the ‘veracity’ 
and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, 
there is a fair probability that contraband . . . will be found in a 
particular place.”
94
 The majority in Dougherty, however, never 
applied the “totality of the circumstances” test. The majority refused 
to acknowledge that child molestation is substantially related to 
possessing child pornography, and there were no other facts 
independent of Dougherty’s alleged child molestation that indicated 
that Dougherty possessed child pornography.
95
 Accordingly, the 
Dougherty majority concluded that Officer Bobkiewicz’s affidavit 
did not “move[] beyond the bare bones” of the conclusions of others 
and qualify for review under the “totality of the circumstances 
test.”
96
 However, since molesting children is substantially related to 
possessing child pornography,
97
 the “totality of the circumstances” 
test should have been applied to the facts of Dougherty. 
Under the “totality of the circumstances” test, there must first 
have been probable cause that Dougherty sexually abused a child 
because probable cause that he possessed child pornography rested 
entirely on the relationship between the two crimes.
98
 The majority 
appears to have accepted that Officer Bobkiewicz had probable cause 
to believe that Dougherty molested at least one child. The court 
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 98. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896. 
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recounted both alleged victims’ statements that Dougherty touched 
them inappropriately, and it neither refuted nor questioned the 
validity of either statement.
99
 The majority’s discussion of the split in 
jurisdictions over the issue of whether evidence of child molestation 
creates probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography 
also suggests that it had accepted that there was probable cause that 
Dougherty had molested two children.
100
 The concurrence similarly 
appears to have accepted that there was probable cause that 
Dougherty molested the two alleged victims.
101
 
Having established that there was probable cause that Dougherty 
molested at least one child, an expert should have then been able to 
conclude that Dougherty possessed child pornography.
102
 This is 
exactly what Officer Bobkiewicz did. In his affidavit, he concluded 
that “based upon [his] training and experience . . . [he knew] subjects 
involved in this type of criminal behavior have in their possession 
child pornography.”
103
 Additionally, there is no indication in either 
the majority or concurring opinion
104
 that the affidavit “consisted of 
rambling boilerplate recitations designed to meet all law enforcement 
needs” or “was not drafted with the facts of this case or this 
particular defendant in mind,” like the affidavit in Weber.
105
 
To the contrary, Officer Bobkiewicz’s affidavit met the Weber 
court’s requirement that “the affidavit . . . address[] the facts of the 
defendant’s case and specifically conclude[] . . . based on those 
facts.”
106
 Indeed, Officer Bobkiewicz specifically concluded—albeit 
implicitly—that it was fairly probable that Dougherty possessed 
child pornography based on the evidence, which was included in the 
 
 99. Id. at 896–99. 
 100. See id. at 899. 
 101. Id. at 901–02 (Brewster, J., concurring) (“I conclude the search warrant was supported 
by probable cause. . . . Dougherty’s pattern of affirmative misconduct with several sixth grade 
students is closely related to an interest in looking at sexual images of minors.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 102. See id.; United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Houston, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 
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probabilities” based on evidence collected and “common-sense conclusions about human 
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Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))). 
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 104. See id. at 895; id. at 901 (Brewster, J., concurring). 
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affidavit, that he touched both a current student’s breasts while 
inappropriately lifting her in class and a past student’s breasts while 
alone in his classroom.
107
 Officer Bobkiewicz also included in the 
affidavit allegations that Dougherty looked up female students’ skirts 
and down their blouses and searched their backs for bra straps.
108
 
Since there was sufficient information to allow a magistrate to 
find probable cause, it was then up to the district court to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and 
basis of Officer Bobkiewicz’s knowledge, there was a fair 
probability that child pornography would have been found at 
Dougherty’s house.
109
 The district court did so, finding the existence 
of such a fair probability to justify the search warrant.
110
 At this 
point, the Ninth Circuit should have accepted the magistrate’s 
determination because the Ninth Circuit owed “great deference” to 
the magistrate’s finding and “the Fourth Amendment[] strong[ly] 
prefer[s] . . . searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”
111
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has mandated that “after-the-fact 
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take 
the form of de novo review.”
112
 Judge Brewster noted as much in her 
concurrence, similarly quoting from the Supreme Court and asserting 
that the magistrate judge’s determination and investigating officer’s 
experience and training were owed more deference than that which 
the majority afforded them.
113
 
Even if no such deference was owed to the magistrate’s finding 
of probable cause, Supreme Court precedent required the Dougherty 
court to affirm the magistrate’s judgment. The Supreme Court’s 
“totality of the circumstances” test is “a fluid and nontechnical 
conception of probable cause,” requiring only that a “fair 
probability” exist that the specified contraband will be found in the 
specified location.
114
 The Court has also required that “evidence . . . 
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must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by 
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement.”
115
 Furthermore, the process of determining probable 
cause “deal[s] with . . . probabilities” and permits law-enforcement 
officers to “formulate[] certain common-sense conclusions about 
human behavior.”
116
 
In line with these standards, it was fairly probable that 
Dougherty possessed child pornography. As an expert in juvenile and 
sex crimes,
117
 Officer Bobkiewicz had a substantial basis of 
knowledge to conclude that Dougherty likely possessed child 
pornography given the evidence that Dougherty was a child 
molester.
118
 Officer Bobkiewicz was permitted to formulate his 
conclusion based on this common sense and training, and the court 
was to weigh the evidence as understood by Officer Bobkiewicz, 
who was “versed in the field of law enforcement.”
119
 Finally, 
because molesting children is significantly related to possessing child 
pornography
120
 and given Officer Bobkiewicz’s expert opinion 
corroborating this relationship, any ruling other than that it was fairly 
probable that Dougherty possessed child pornography departs from 
the practicality and common sense that the “totality of the 
circumstances” test requires. 
Finding probable cause to believe that Dougherty possessed 
child pornography based on the facts indicating that he was a child 
molester would have also been consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 
own precedent as it relates to searches for firearms in narcotics 
investigations.
121
 In United States v. Nance,
122
 for instance, the court 
found probable cause supporting a search warrant for firearms, which 
was based mainly on evidence that the suspect was a drug dealer.
123
 
In upholding the search warrant for one crime based on evidence of 
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an entirely different crime, the court explained that the investigating 
officer who submitted the affidavit “knew, based on his experience 
and training, that people who distribute narcotics keep drug supplies, 
paraphernalia, records and weapons in their homes.”
124
 Just as selling 
drugs is related to possessing firearms, molesting children is related 
to possessing child pornography.
125
 Accordingly, since the Ninth 
Circuit routinely upholds search warrants for firearms where 
evidence indicates that a suspect is a narcotics distributor, the court 
should similarly uphold search warrants for child pornography where 
evidence indicates that the suspect is a child molester. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
By misapplying United States v. Weber, discounting the 
significant relationship between molesting children and possessing 
child pornography, and failing to uphold the search warrant for child 
pornography, the Ninth Circuit failed to connect the logical dots in 
its holding in Dougherty v. City of Covina. These three errors 
consequently add up to one significant consequence: the court has 
made obtaining search warrants for child pornography much more 
difficult for law-enforcement officers. 
The significant harms that child pornography inflicts on the 
children involved demonstrates the severity of this consequence. 
Perhaps one the most troubling aspects of child pornography is that 
“it inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child 
pornographers who prey on children, thereby increasing the creation 
and distribution of child pornography and the sexual abuse and 
exploitation of actual children who are victimized as a result of the 
existence and use of these materials.”
126
 Additionally, child 
molesters often use child pornography as part of a method of 
seducing other children into sexual activity.
127
 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit en banc should overrule the dangerous precedent that 
Dougherty v. City of Covina established. It would, however, be even 
more ideal for the U.S. Supreme Court to settle the split among the 
federal appellate courts in favor of facilitating search warrants for 
child pornography based on evidence that the suspect is a child 
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molester. This would extinguish the socially harmful consequences 
of Dougherty and its Second and Sixth Circuit ilk throughout the 
entire country and connect the logical dots between sexually abusing 
a child and possessing child pornography. Such a decision by either 
the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court would accordingly advance 
the intentions of Congress
128
 and more fully comport with the less 
exacting requirements for determining probable cause that the 
Supreme Court established in Gates.
129
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